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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF PEACE 
 
Diane Marie Amann
*
 
 
 I am very honored, and most deeply humbled, by this Prominent Woman in International 
Law award. I am humbled when I look at the list of prior recipients.
1
 They include: Patricia Wald 
and Mireille Delmas-Marty, two women whose lifework has inspired my own; stateswomen like 
Patricia Schroeder and Geraldine Ferraro; American Society of International Law leaders like 
Lucy Reed and Edith Brown Weiss; another woman who serves as a Special Adviser to the 
International Criminal Court Prosecutor, Patricia Viseur Sellers; and even a woman who, like me, 
once clerked for Justice John Paul Stevens, Carol Lee. (Indeed, as of today Justice Stevens may 
add “feeder judge for PWIL award” to his long list of accomplishments.)  
 I am even more humbled when I think of all the amazing international law women who 
deserve this award. To name a very few: our new ASIL President-Elect, Lori Damrosch (who is 
here with her mother, Jean Fisler, a WILIG stalwart), not to mention ASIL fearless leader Betsy 
Andersen; Joan Donoghue and her sisters on the International Court of Justice; the ICC Prosecutor 
whom I am honored to serve, Fatou Bensouda, as well as my sister Special Advisers, Leila Sadat 
                                                        
* Emily and Ernest Woodruff Chair in International Law, University of Georgia School of Law. This talk was 
delivered on April 4, 2013, during the American Society of International Law Women in International Law Interest 
Group luncheon at which the author was honored with the group’s Prominent Woman in International Law award. 
This essay is part of a larger project on the value of peace; that project has been aided by research assistance from 
Kaitlin M. Ball and Anders S. Nelson, by library assistance from T.J. Striepe, and by comments made during my 
presentations at the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as 
well as the law schools at Arizona State University and the University of Georgia. 
1 See The American Society of International Law Women in International Law Interest Group Prominent Woman in 
International Law Award, available at https://file.smartbins.net/download/2afe25c4357c5eea4eeb62fe8f8edd12 
(visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245372
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and Brigid Inder; stateswomen like Mary Robinson and Hillary Clinton; and still another woman 
whose lifework has inspired my own, Martha Minow.  
 I am humbled, finally, to accept this award not only on my behalf, but also on behalf of my 
three co-editors, Kate Doty, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and Beth Van Schaack, and, indeed, on behalf of 
the more than 300 women (plus a few men) who have contributed to IntLawGrrls.
2
 Those of you 
who are with us here today, please stand. Thank you. This award belongs to every one of you. 
 (You know, I never had a sister, and my mother has been gone for more than a decade now. 
But I would like to give shout-out to the men in my life: my husband, Peter O’Neill, and our son, 
Tiernan O’Neill. Tiernan is in school today, so they had to stay at home, but they are here today in 
my heart.) 
 Even though we are all winners, our general dislike for cacophony demands that only one 
of us speak today. That honor falls to me, and given that this is a lunch talk, I have chosen a light 
and modest topic. Well, no, I’m afraid I have not. My title is, in fact, “International Law and the 
Future of Peace.” For this audience, it might more fittingly be called “Peace: A Feminist Project.”3 
 As many of you know, IntLawGrrls often dedicated their contributions to transnational 
foremothers.
4
 Consistent with the assumption that we women are more nurturing than, shall we 
say, other humans,
5
 contributors frequently chose to honor pacifist heroines. Many from this 
                                                        
2 For the roster of persons who contributed during the 2007-12 edition of this blog, see Contributors, INTLAWGRRLS, 
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/p/contributors.html (visited Mar. 31, 2013). Contributors to the current edition are listed 
as “Voices” in the righthand column at INTLAWGRRLS, http://ilg2.org/ (visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
3 Many articles point to a “feminist project” in law generally, and international law specifically – so much so that at a 
previous annual meeting of this Society, one panelist spoke of “the perennial question of ‘what is the feminist project 
in law?’” Catherine O’Rourke, Remarks, in Feminism v. Feminism: What Is a Feminist Approach to Transnational 
Criminal Law?, 102 ASIL Proc. 269, 274, 275 (2008). The first journal reference to the term found in Westlaw is 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710 (1982) (reviewing ANN JONES, 
WOMEN WHO KILL (1980)). 
4 For the complete list of women honored, see Foremothers, INTLAWGRRLS, 
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/p/foremothers.html (visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
5 This assumption is, of course, contestable. See Hilary Charlesworth, Are Women Peaceful? Reflections on the Role 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245372
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group of foremothers rode what is sometimes called the first wave of feminism – that period in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when many women (plus a few men) campaigned for 
change. Members of this movement are best known for winning women the vote; that goal, 
however, was but one of several that animated them. Equally important to many of these feminists 
was pacifism. Theirs was an all-out quest to end war. One such campaigner was Jeannette Rankin, 
who, as a rare woman member of Congress, voted “No” on legislation by which the United States 
entered into World War I and, twenty-three years later, into World War II.
6
 Another was Jane 
Addams, who lectured for peace and against war, and led the U.S.-based Women’s Peace Party. In 
1915, Addams chaired the International Congress of Women at The Hague and became the 
founding President of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, an organization 
that thrives to this day. For her efforts Addams eventually would receive the Nobel Peace Prize.
7
 
Despite her achievements, it must be noted, ASIL denied Addams’s application for membership: 
as chronicled in a 1974 American Journal of International Law article co-authored by Alona 
Evans, Addams was “invited, instead, to subscribe to the Journal ‘for the same amount as the 
annual dues ....’”8 No woman was admitted to membership until 1921, when the Constitution’s 
guarantee of women’s suffrage appears to have forced the Society’s hand.9 
 It must also be noted that not every foremother was a woman of peace. Quite to the 
contrary. The pirate Gráinne Ní Mháille, or Grace O’Malley, was cited by me and by nearly every 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of Women in Peace-Building, 16 FEM. LEG. STUD. 347, 357 (2008) (challenging “[t]he idea that women are somehow 
predisposed to be peaceful and naturally gifted as peace-builders”). 
6 See NORMA SMITH, JEANNETTE RANKIN 16, 26, 105, 111-14,156, 183, 236 (2002). 
7 All autobiographical details are drawn from Peace 1931: Jane Addams, Nicholas Murray Butler, in II NOBEL 
LECTURES INCLUDING PRESENTATION SPEECHES AND LAUREATES’ BIOGRAPHIES: PEACE 1926-1950 123, 
132-35(Frederick W. Haberman ed., 1972). 
8 Alona E. Evans & Carol Per Lee Plumb, Women and the American Society of International Law, 68 AM. J. INT’L L. 
290, 291 (1974) (quoting letter from James Brown Scott, then ASIL’s Recording Secretary and later its President, to 
“Miss Jane Adams,” April 17, 1915); see FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW’S 
FIRST CENTURY 1906-2006 12 (2006) (recounting this history). 
9 See Evans & Plumb, supra note 8, at 291; see also KIRGIS, supra note 8, at 12. 
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other Irish IntLawGrrl. Selected from Asia were Lakshmi Bai and Trưng Trắc; from Africa, Ndaté 
Yàlla; and from the Caribbean, Anacaona and Nanny of the Maroons. At instances in her career, 
each of these women resorted to combat as a means to keep her people free from conquest or 
exploitation. 
 That we IntLawGrrls chose to honor warriors and pacifists alike points to a central paradox 
of peace. In its purest sense, pacifism connotes opposition to violence.
10
 And surely, the human 
condition is advanced every time that a life-threatening attack is averted. But the absence of that 
sort of violence – the nonuse of force, as we lawyers call it – is not, in and of itself, peace. 
Whenever a careful examination reveals an apparent absence of violence to be little more than a 
veneer that masks exploitation, there is no peace. It is in recognition of this fact that the 
peacemaker who died forty-five years ago today, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., made clear his 
preference not for “negative peace which is the absence of tension,” but rather for “positive peace 
which is the presence of justice.”11 Similarly, a leading theorist of peace, the Norwegian 
sociologist Johan Galtung, distinguished attacks, which he called “direct violence,” from 
exploitation, which he called “structural violence.”12 Galtung insisted on attention to the latter as 
well as the former, “not only because exploitation may lead to direct violence,” but also, and 
perhaps most importantly, because exploitation “is violence in itself.”13 This fuller understanding 
of peace, this acknowledgment that exploitation is itself violence, poses a challenge, Galtung 
wrote: the challenge is to reduce direct violence – to promote the nonuse of force – without 
                                                        
10 See Pacifism, in THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 941 (William Morris ed., 
1973) (listing, as the second meaning of the term, “[o]pposition to war or violence as a means of resolving disputes,” 
and, as the first meaning, “belief that disputes between nations should and can be settled peacefully”). 
11 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM THE BIRMINGHAM JAIL 15-16 (HarperSan Francisco 1994) (1963). 
12 Johan Galtung, Nonterritorial Actors and the Problem of Peace, in ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER 
151, 151 (Saul H. Mendlovitz ed., 1975). 
13 Id. at 154 (emphasis in original omitted). 
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simultaneously enabling exploitation.
14
 In short, there is a line to be drawn, and in our world, the 
task of drawing that line often falls to the shapers of international law. 
 We all know in broad outline the rules that govern the use of force. They appear in the 
foundational text of modern international law, the Charter of the United Nations. From 1945 
onwards, U.N. member states promised to “settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,” and further to 
“refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state ....”15 States reserved an “inherent right” of self-defense, but 
only “if an armed attack occurs ..., until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”16 We know too that at Nuremberg and in Tokyo, 
convicted leaders were hanged for committing aggressive war – called crimes against peace – and 
for the atrocities that ensued.
17
 Taken together, these developments signaled that no state would be 
permitted to launch an offensive attack, that none therefore would need to exercise self-defense, 
and that leaders who acted in violation would be punished. That legal framework ought to have put 
an end to war, or at least to war between states. It did not. 
 The next six decades saw a number of international armed conflicts, as well as many 
conflicts dubbed “not of an international character” even though outside countries were aiding one 
                                                        
14 Using the term “associative policies” to refer to interstate efforts at cooperation, Galtung wrote: 
Clearly the problem is to bring parties together to prevent direct violence without at the same time 
creating structural violence. This is the general problem of peace politics in our time: how to 
practice associative policies as a bulwark against direct violence without at the same time getting 
into the pitfalls of structural violence. 
Id. 
15 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(3), (4). 
16 Id., art. 51. 
17 See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992); YUMA TOTANI, THE TOKYO 
WAR CRIMES TRIAL (2008). Cf. JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG 80, 174-75 (1982) (stating that U.S. 
prosecutors at Nuremberg argued that aggression “had become a customary, uncodified war crime by virtue of a 
progressive chain of events,” dating to the post-World War I era and including “the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand 
treaty outlawing war”). 
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side or another. Examples are the Iran-Iraq War and the struggle in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, each of which claimed a million or more lives.
18
 In the face of such conflicts, the Security 
Council often failed to shoulder its responsibility to maintain peace; that is, it failed both to stop 
attacks and to bring attackers to account.
19
 From these failures emerged new doctrines, by which 
states sought to justify acting outside the confines of the Council. The timing requirement for 
self-defense was said to permit reaction not only after, or in immediate anticipation of, an armed 
attack, but also well before a presumed attack is imminent.
20
 States were said to be free to use 
force so long as such use would not be “inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”;21 
for example, in order to rescue their own nationals.
22
 Also said to serve U.N. purposes was the 
resort to force in defense of others, commonly known, of course, as humanitarian intervention.
23
 
And what of the crime against peace that was prosecuted in the Nuremberg era? Concern was 
expressed; it was said that authorizing the ICC to punish this offense of aggression might have a 
chilling effect on interventions undertaken in the name of rescuing humanity.
24
 Among those 
                                                        
18 See Ian Black, Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 23, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary;  
Peter James Spielmann, Review of Congo war halves death toll, AP DATASTREAM, Jan. 20, 2010, available in 
Westlaw, 1/20/10 AP DataStream 19:07:01 (reporting on studies that lowered original casualty estimate of 5.4 million 
to half that number, still well over 2 million persons). 
19 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 24(1) (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”). 
20
 See, e.g., THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/, discussed generally in Diane Marie Amann, Unipolar 
Disorder: A European Perspective on U.S. Security Strategy, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 447 (2004). 
21 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(3). 
22 See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, Note, Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the Lawfulness of Forcible 
Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 451 (2008). 
23 See generally Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 1275 (2010). Cf. Diane Marie Amann, The Course of True Human Rights Progress Never Did Run Smooth, 21 
HARV. H. RTS. J. 171, 173-74 & n.11 (2008) [hereinafter Amann, Course] (writing of some commentators’ uneasiness 
respecting humanitarian intervention). 
24 See, e.g., Erin Creegan, A Permanent Hybrid Court for Terrorism, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 254-55 (2011); 
Beth Van Schaack,“The Grass That Gets Trampled When Elephants Fight”: Will the Codification of the Crime of 
Aggression Protect Women?,15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 327, 334 (2010). But see Stefan Barriga and Leena 
Grover, a Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 522 n.14 (2011) (“A genuine 
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giving voice to this concern was my dear colleague, Professor Van Schaack. While putting it 
forward in a 2010 article, however, she acknowledged that privileging this concern has 
consequences. To deny international mechanisms the power to question war-making decisions is, 
in effect, to give leaders the right to choose whether to intervene. Accepting that result “requires,” 
she wrote, “coming to terms with a certain valorization of militarism.”25 
 Her words serve to underscore one feature of these emergent doctrines: they condone 
violence; that is, they justify meeting violence with violence. In my view, this too is cause for 
concern. Suffering and death, even atrocities, are the inevitable spawn even of just wars.
26
 
Doctrinal emphasis on forcible options tends to downplay human costs
27
 and to inflate presumed 
threats; this may be discerned in speeches in which officials of the United States have sought to 
defend lethal drone strikes.
28
 An emphasis on force likewise tends to disregard nonforcible paths 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization would, by its gravity and character, not fulfill the 
criterion of a manifest Charter violation since its legality under general international law is at least debatable.”) (citing 
Claus Kreß, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to 
Andreas Paulus, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1129 (2010)). 
25 Van Schaack, supra note 24, at 334. 
26 See Diane Marie Amann, Kampala as cause to celebrate, INTLAWGRRLS, Sept. 10, 2010, 
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2010/09/kampala-as-cause-to-celebrate.html (quoting lecture in which Professor William 
A. Schabas accepted that at times force may be necessary, but added that he would not “‘exaggerate the importance of 
that, because war brings atrocities, inevitably’”). 
27 At the time of the first Gulf War, one commentator called “disturbing” the fact that, in contrast with environmental 
damage, the issue of civilian casualties had “attracted almost no scholarly analysis. Judith Gail Gardam, The Law of 
Armed Conflict: A Gendered Regime?, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 172 
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993). Notwithstanding observation of “the salience of civilians in modern conflicts,” 
Adam Roberts, The Civilian in Modern War, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 13, 16 (2009), quantification of the 
losses suffered by civilians remains less accurate than the quantification of military casualties. See Diane Marie 
Amann, …and counting…, INTLAWGRRLS, Feb. 24, 2007 (noting variations in casualty counts in Iraq, and quoting an 
Associated Press report of a comment by a Duke University political scientist, that “[p]eople in democracies generally 
don’t shy away from inflicting civilian casualties”), http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2007/02/and-counting.html. 
28 See John O. Brennan, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012) (stating 
in speech that “[a]s a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, 
and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with our inherent right of 
national self-defense,” and furthermore that “[t]here is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely 
piloted aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active 
battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat”), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100; Harold 
Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (asserting, in an ASIL annual 
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to peace; this is evident in writings that consider the concept of responsibility to protect almost 
solely within the context of military intervention.
29
 In similar vein, the easy justification of force 
invites states to abandon too hastily the difficult pursuit of pacific dispute settlement. The example 
that jumps to mind is the 2003 decision to dispense with diplomacy and invade Iraq. Invasion led 
not to the promised discovery of enemy weapons of mass destruction, but rather to the deaths of 
nearly 5,000 service members and more than 100,000 civilians, to the displacement of well over a 
million persons, and to costs in the trillions of dollars.
30
 
 Our pacifist heroine, Jane Addams, would have had none of this. In 1915, a year into the 
conflict on the Continent, Addams bemoaned that “because of war, the finest consciences in 
Europe are put to the old business of self-justification, of utilizing outgrown myths to explain the 
course of action which their governments have taken.”31 Addams argued that the war footing 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
meeting speech, that “a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide 
targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force”), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at 
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (contending that “the fact that we are not in a conventional 
war” changes neither the domestic authority “to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack” nor the 
international law that “recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense”), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
29 See, e.g., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul F. Diehl, Caution in What You Wish For: the Consequences of a Right 
to Democracy, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 289, 295 (2012); Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Variable Multipolarity and U.N. Security 
Council Reform, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 449, 478, 492-93 (2012); Rosa Brooks, The problem with the drone war that no 
one’s talking about, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 22, 2013, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/sunday-commentary/20130222-rosa-brooks-the-problem-with-the-drone-war-th
at-no-ones-talking-about.ece. For a more comprehensive account of the doctrine, see Patricia O’Brien, The United 
Nations & the Responsibility to Protect, INTLAWGRRLS, Apr. 5, 2012 (reprinting U.N. Legal Counsel’s remarks at 
ASIL’s 2010 annual meeting), http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/04/united-nations-responsibility-to.html. 
30 See Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ (visited Mar. 31, 2013) (stating that there had been between 
111,840 and 122,320 “civilian deaths from violence” since the Iraq invasion); Iraq Casualty Count, 
http://icasualties.org/ (visited Mar. 31, 2013) (tabulating 4,804 deaths of coalition service members between 2003 and 
2012); Ernesto Londoño, Iraq, Afghan wars will cost to $4 trillion to $6 trillion, Harvard study says, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR 7696661; Studies examine effects of Iraq war on US and UK, DEUTSCHE-WELLE, Mar. 
15, 2013 (citing nearly 200,000 deaths and costs of more than $2 trillion), 
http://www.dw.de/studies-examine-effects-of-iraq-war-on-us-and-uk/a-16676385; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
2013 UNHCR country operations profile - Iraq, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html (visited Mar. 31, 2013) 
(citing, in table, more than 1.4 million Iraqi refugees and another 1.3 million internally displaced Iraqis). 
31 Jane Addams, What War Is Destroying, in 4 JANE ADDAMS’S WRITINGS ON PEACE 61, 61 (Marilyn Fischer & Judy 
D. Whipps eds., 2003) [hereinafter WRITINGS ON PEACE] (reprinting essay originally published at volume 77 of THE 
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dispossessed women in particular of values in which they “held a vested interest”; the ideal of a 
state founded upon individual liberty rather than collective fear, for example, as well as “the belief 
that human life is sacred above all else that the planet contains.”32 
 “Yes, well, but,” I hear some of you thinking. “But what happens when human life is not 
held sacred? What happens when a president so values power, or a rebel so lusts for power, that he 
will harm even his own people in order to secure it?” In sum, you ask: “What is to be done about 
Syria?”  
In contrast with Libya, where NATO’s 2011 actions are said to have prevented a 
bloodbath,
33
 in Syria, the past two years of nonaction have produced a death toll that exceeds 
70,000 children, women, and men.
34
 Countless more Syrians have suffered displacement, rape, or 
torture. Syria seems a paradigmatic case for military intervention. Yet it must be remembered that 
other means have not really been tried. The ultimate international cause of the Syrian tragedy is a 
failure of diplomacy; that is, the refusal of an essential U.N. member state to exert genuine, 
effective pressure on the Syrian regime.
35
 Russia’s refusal has impeded attempts to ease the crisis 
via nonforcible measures, such as the sanctions and the ICC referral that preceded NATO’s action 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ADVOCATE OF PEACE, Mar. 1915, at 64-65). 
32 See id. at 61-62. I draw the term “collective fear” from Addams’s references to “a trial conception” of “patriotism” 
as a call to “march and fight” in order to “save their homes from destruction.” Id. at 61. It was, she wrote, “an irrational 
appeal which ought to have left the world long since.” Id. 
33
 See Helene Cooper & Steven Lee Myers, Shift by Clinton Helped Persuade President to Take a Harder Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A1 (discussing how desire to prevent a repeat of the 1994 Rwanda genocide motivated U.S. 
officials to push for military intervention in Libya). 
34 See Statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security Council, on 12 February 2013 during 
the Council’s thematic debate on the Protection of Civilians, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12990&LangID=E (visited Mar. 31, 
2013); Raja Abdulrahim, Syrian civil war enters third year, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2013, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-syria-war-assad-third-year-20130315,0,1650959.story. 
35 See Samuel Charap, Why Russia Won’t Help on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2013, 2013 WLNR 76564 (“Moscow 
does not believe the U.N. Security Council should be in the business of endorsing the removal of a sitting 
government.”); Denis Corboy, William Courtney & Kenneth Yalowitz, Dealing With Two Russias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2013, 2013 WLNR 1940921 (writing that “stubborn support for the Assad regime in Syria has tarnished the 
prestige of Russia”). Russia’s support is essential because, as a permanent member of the Security Council, it may veto 
any Council action with which it disagrees. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 23(1), 27(3). 
10 
 
in Libya.
36
 Russia’s refusal, moreover, has permitted unconscionable loss of life and stoked calls 
for military intervention without the approval of the Security Council. 
 Let us suppose for a moment that the calls for freedom-fighting prevail, that a coalition of 
states deploys armed force against the Syrian regime. Is there then is a role for persons who prefer 
pacific settlement of disputes? There is, I would submit, and it is a role with at least three facets. 
The first facet is to pinpoint the lines drawn by international law – to caution that a decision to 
operate in the doctrinal grey area of humanitarian intervention does not free policymakers from 
other laws of armed conflict, such as the principle of proportionality and the injunction to wage 
war as humanely as possible. The second facet is to remind that even well-intended violence 
begets violence – providing a case in point is the report that weapons looted during the chaos in 
Libya two years ago today fuel the combat in Mali.
37
 Finally, the third facet is to continue the hard 
work of improving global society – to demand not only that each state lives up to its own 
obligations, but also that each state pressures others to follow suit and sanctions them when they 
fail to do so. 
 This demand helps to ensure human security.
38
 This demand seeks not just to stop attacks, 
but also to undo exploitation; that is, to buttress the legal framework that protects humans against 
                                                        
36 See S.C. Res. 1970, UN. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
37 See C. J. Chivers, Looted Libyan Arms in Mali May Have Shifted Conflict’s Path, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2013, at A4. 
Libya itself reportedly has remained unstable. See Steven Erlanger, Two Years After Revolt, Libya Faces a Host of 
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.13, 2013, at A7. 
38 I choose to write of human “security,” rather than “rights,” for the reason that rights too often are realized only after 
they are violated, and even then only by the few victims who possess resources to seek redress. I have written 
elsewhere: 
[W]hereas ‘human rights’ activists often look to judges for vindication, in the form of post hoc 
compensation for individual deprivations of rights, ‘human security’ is not so limited. Security may 
be secured without resort to the courts – indeed, I would argue that it is best secured when it is 
embedded in the structure of the system, so that insecurity never occurs. In this sense the actors most 
responsible for human security are the legislators who establish the protective/preventive structure 
and the executive officers who implement that structure. Judges are not the first guarantors of 
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and within the state. In short, this demand subverts structural violence as well as direct violence, 
and so serves the fullest understanding of peace. 
 Not surprisingly, this is a demand that Jane Addams made upon the United States when it 
joined World War I. With an eye to postwar reconstruction, she wrote that the United States must 
“protec[t] and preserv[e] the higher standards of internationalism.” 39 And casting her eye at the 
war itself, she urged the United States to send Europe food, so that not even the enemy’s “women 
and children” would starve.40 Addams’s emphasis on children was no accident. Like many 
feminists of her era, as dear to her as suffrage and pacifism were children; to be precise, the freeing 
of children from factory labor and the protecting of children from the worst ravages of war.  
 This last goal, of seeking peace for future generations, inspires me in my new role as 
Special Adviser on Children in and affected by Armed Conflict. It provides me with one answer to 
the perennial question, “What can I do?” With your indulgence, before closing this talk I would 
like to suggest a few more things that we can do. 
 Let me first address what we can do as members of ASIL’s Women in International Law 
Interest Group. 
 We can honor our foremothers. We can read and teach and write about women such as 
Addams, like me a native Illinoisan, and Congresswoman Rankin, who for years lived just miles 
from what is now my home in north Georgia. We can ask ASIL to right wrongs done a century ago 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
human security; they are, rather, the very last resort. In a system that fully guaranteed human 
security, the judiciary would have no role at all to play. 
Diane Marie Amann, Climate Change and Human Security, at 3 (English-language version, available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/rycj0o0e5da6iee/climate_eng_2008.pdf, of Diane Marie Amann, Le changement 
climatique et la sécurité humaine, in REGARDS CROISÉS SUR L’INTERNATIONALISATION DU DROIT : 
FRANCE-ÉTATS-UNIS 239, 242-43 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & Stephen Breyer, eds., 2009)). See also Amann, Course, 
supra note 23, at 176-79 (exploring the concept of human security within the framework of U.S. understandings of the 
role of the state vis-à-vis individual persons). 
39 Jane Addams, Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time, in WRITINGS ON PEACE, supra note 31, at 153, 159, 160 
(reprinting presentation made at May 15, 1917, meeting of the City Club of Chicago). 
40 Id. 
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by granting posthumous membership to all women whose pre-1921 applications were denied. 
Alona Evans’s article cites not only Addams in this regard, but also Belva Ann Lockwood, who 
was the first woman to run for President of the United States and the first to argue a case before the 
Supreme Court.
41
 
 We can also honor Evans, whose Wellesley career included a stint as thesis advisor to 
Hillary Rodham, the young woman who grew to become our most recent Secretary of State.
42
 
Evans’s long service to ASIL was recognized by her election as its first woman President, in 1980 
– but then cut short when she died before the year was out.43 In her will Evans left $40,000 to the 
Society;
44
 it is my personal hope that one day she will be made the namesake of ASIL’s 
Patron-level donors. 
 Let me conclude by reciting what we can do as scholars and practitioners of international 
law. 
We can work to assure that nonforcible means of intervention are fully considered. And we 
can insist that when such mechanisms – for instance, Security Council referral to the ICC – are 
chosen, those mechanisms are given the monetary and other resources they need to complete the 
task before them. 
 We can expose to searching scrutiny, against the backdrop of law, every use of armed 
force. And even when what they have to say causes some of us discomfort, we can welcome, and 
not shun, the voices of our sisters, and brothers, who speak law to power. 
                                                        
41 See Evans & Plumb, supra note 8, at 290-91; see also KIRGIS, supra note 7, at 12. 
42 See Hillary D. Rodham, “There Is Only the Fight...” An Analysis of the Alinsky Model i (1969) (unpublished B.A. 
thesis, Wellesley University) (on file with the Wellesley University Library) (expressing “special appreciation” to 
“Miss Alona E. Evans for her thoughtful questioning and careful editing that clarified fuzzy thinking and tortured 
prose”). 
43 See KIRGIS, supra note 8, at 391-92. 
44 See id. at 392 n.66. 
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 In these and other ways, we, each of us, can aid the pursuit of peace. 
